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The Aristotelian Concept of a Friend

Renan Cal-Ortiz Jubilo

“For no one would choose to live without friends

even if he had all the other goods.”

- Aristotle -

Man’s political nature, that is, his tendency to live with others or to co-exist, necessitates the need for friends.  Aristotle devoted a critical discussion in this matter for he believes that friendship is an essential part of man’s telos which is eudaimonia or “happiness or well-being”.  Aristotle’s ethics is essentially the art of living well.  Living well is characterized by the actualization of one’s nature.  It is the perfection of one’s function, a perfection of one’s craft.  Man’s proper function or the craft proper to human being is the distinctively human phenomenon of action arising from reason.  According to Sarah Broadie in her book Ethics with Aristotle, “Aristotle’s supreme good is the well functioning of the human being qua human; functioning well is nothing other than ‘activity in accordance with virtue.”  Since a eudaimon life is seen as an actualization of one’s potentialities, happiness is not a mere state, but an activity.  It is through action guided by reason that man actualizes himself.  Man, being capable of reason, chooses fine actions that will make him excel for he acts and lives with reason.  And if man’s life is a life of activity, friendship is substantial for it is a way of enhancing one’s activity. 

The telos of friendship is the actualization of one’s potentialities.  Soulless beings are not capable of friendship for one necessary condition for friendship is mutual loving.  Since soulless things are incapable of mutual loving, friendship is not possible among them.  Friendship is not mere goodwill where one wishes good things for the other; instead it is a reciprocated goodwill.  In friendship, one wishes good things for the other in the same way as the other wishes good things for him in return.  Awareness is a key factor since in reciprocating, one is presupposed to be aware of what the other is giving or wishing him to have.  In normal human situation, friends know that his friend loves and cares for him and in return feels the same towards his friend.  If only one person is showing his concern, love and care towards another and the other is not responding in a way that he should do, it cannot be consider a friendship even in the most casual way.  Friendship always involves mutual and reciprocal love and care.  In friendship, both parties enjoy, grow, learn and cherish each other.

For Aristotle, a friend is another me, a mirror where one can see himself better.  A friend helps actualize his friend not merely by mirroring what is already known to his friend but most especially what are his possibilities, his potentialities.  It can be observed that it is only in the presence of a friend that man can be himself, devoid of any pretentions, free of any inhibitions.  That is why a true friend is someone who knows his friend well not only what he is but most especially what he is capable of.  Aristotle differentiates three kinds of friendship in order to clarify what he meant by a “friend”.  The first two, friendships based on utility and pleasure alone, are incomplete for they are contingent on changeable situations and dispositions, on emotions, feelings and accidental attributes.  Friendship based on utility perishes easily for the need of every man changes from situation to another. If one is your friend because he needs your help today, in the near future things may change and you may be of no usage to him anymore.  This kind of friendship is usually found in friendships of older people for they are the ones who are always in need of help due to weakness and inabilities.  Friendship of pleasure, on the other hand, is common for younger generations since their lives are guided by feelings and they live and choose through emotions.  But this kind of friendship is easily dissolved once the beloved is not pleasant anymore.  Friendship of this kind is easily developed but does not endure for the basis of the friendship, which is feeling or emotion, is erratic and unpredictable.  Complete friendship is between good people or virtuous people; “for they wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good and they are good in themselves.”[1]  It is complete since it is based not on the accidental characteristics of a man but on virtue that is enduring and reliable.  Since it is a friendship between equally good individual, no one is abused by the other and both of them are useful and pleasant for each other.  Friendship of this kind is characterized by equality.  Unlike the first two kinds, friendship of virtue endures for it is based on an enduring state of being virtuous.  In friendship of virtue, both wishes good for each other for the sake of another because the other is good in itself and not because of anything else.  Aristotle believes that this kind of friendship is rare for there are only few virtuous people.  The minimum requirement to have friendship by virtue is that the friendship be based on virtue or that they are both virtuous.  A criticism on this position stems from the presupposition that a virtuous person is someone that is complete, self-sufficient and no need for any addition.  If friendship by virtue is possible only among virtuous people, there will be a contradiction on the idea of self-sufficiency.  A self-sufficient individual does not need a friend because he is already complete.  Aristotle argued that although an excellent person would not mind solitude for his character has been developed, he will always value friendship for it is needed in self-sufficiency.  Friendship is choiceworthy since it is naturally good and pleasant; therefore, it is valued by a virtuous person since if he lacks something choiceworthy he will no longer be self-sufficient.

In his description of the features of a complete friendship however, Aristotle essentially draw a parallel comparison between the idea of a complete friendship and the notion of self-love.  There are five features of a complete friendship (friendship of virtue); 1)  X wishes and does goods to Y, for Y’s sake, 2)  X wishes Y to live and to exist, for Y’s sake, 3)  X spends time with Y, 4)  X makes the same choices as Y, 5)  X shares Y’s distress and enjoyment.   These features are analogous to what a man desired or wish for himself.  Man wishes what is pleasant and what will promote his excellence.  He wants to survive and spends time with himself, enjoying every moment of it.  He also wants to be in control of his decisions and thus regulate them.  He experiences constant pains and pleasures in the same things for he has an enduring virtuous disposition.  That is why; it is with great sense if many would claim that Aristotle’s conception of friendship is an egoistic one.  It may be the same as self-love, but the notion of Aristotle’s self-love is wider in scope than what we usually think of.  To understand this further, there is a need to clarify the difference between bad self-love and good self- love.  Bad self-love is greediness, where one tends to excessively award himself with base pleasures and in turn intensifies his appetites, feelings and emotions.  On one hand, good self-love can be seen when one aims at all possible finest and proper pleasures and thus enrich the rational part of his being.  For Aristotle, true self-love is characterized by actions guided by reason not by feelings and aims on what is fine and proper and not on what is advantageous.   The parallelism between complete friendship and true or good self-love lies in the attitude of the friend who considers his beloved not as another entity but as his other-self.  In the Bible, the same idea is conveyed by one of the greatest commandments according to Jesus Christ which is “Love your neighbors as you love yourself”.  Aristotle and Jesus Christ had a common belief that true and complete friendship is something that is personal.  It is a personal love towards the beloved who is not seen as another person but as another self.  In this manner, a friend will treat his beloved in the way he treats and wishes for himself.  This complete friendship, characterized by a true and good self-love, is not egoistic but is altruistic for the reason that what is important is still the welfare of the beloved.  The friend wishes all the pleasant and finest things for his beloved not for his sake but for the beloved’s sake and welfare.

“A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere.

Before him I may think aloud."
                                                                                       - Ralph Waldo Emerson -

Are we responsible for our moral character?  Or, are there elements of luck in the formation of our moral character?  If so, what exactly does this imply about our responsibility for the formation of our moral selves?

- Renan Cal-Ortiz Jubilo -

                        Aristotle’s moral teachings centered on the discussion of the good that man pursues in life.  He clarified in the beginning of his book, “Nicomachean Ethics”, that every action that man does aims at some good.  Good is described as “that at which everything aims”.  Every action has its purpose for every action is directed toward something.  The highest good that man aims is his “Eudaimonia” or most commonly translated as “happiness” but appropriately would mean “excellence or well-being”.  It is commonly translated as happiness since the highest good’s characteristics seems identical with our concept of happiness.  Happiness is pursued not because of anything else but itself.  Like happiness, the highest good is something desirable not because of some other things, but solely because of itself.

Reason sets us apart from other beings in our pursuit for our eudaimonia.  Although we share with other beings our appetite for the highest good, our ways to achieve it is always influenced by our capacity for reason.  Our capacity for reason enables us to acquire virtues.  The virtue of a thing is its proper excellence.  And since we are capable of reason, our virtue consists in excellent rational activity.  Our capability for reason makes us responsible for our moral character.  One is morally responsible for his action when he can be blamed or praised for it.  To be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction — praise, blame, or something akin to these — for having performed it. 

                        In order to elaborate on the role of reason in our moral development and thus our responsibility for our moral character, I must first establish what role reason plays in man’s moral development.  The process of acquiring virtue, where man consciously and with full awareness chooses a virtue rather than a vice, is the same process where man develops and enhances his moral character.  Since virtue molds one’s character, and since it influences how he behaves, acquiring proper virtue is of utmost importance if not necessary for man’s moral growth. 

                        Virtue is the mean between two extremities.  It is an intermediate and can be numerical or relative.  In determining the mean considered as virtue, one’s idea of the mean must not be numerical rather it must be relative.  It must not be the mean measured by its equidistance in reference to the two extremes or the numerical mean identified through the science of mathematics.  The mean, we want to know here, is the intermediate that is relatively identified considering one’s perspective, background and situation.  It is relative since one will subjectively decide whether in this certain situation, of this certain background and from this certain perspective; it is the intermediate which is neither superfluous nor deficient.  There will be a sense of weighing at this moment and a decision has to be made after all the choices are properly considered.  The intermediate is always decided upon knowing the extremities.  It is always chosen with reference to the extremes.  It is in identifying what are the extremes that one can decide what is proper, what is intermediate, what is the mean.  In identifying the mean, reason plays a very important role.  In deciding what is to be the intermediate, it is presupposed that one has an understanding of what situation or background he is working with.  In this process, reason has a significant function and is essential in the development of our moral character.  Moral development in one way or another is a conscious process.

                        No virtue comes naturally, like a craft, it is acquired though experience, through the process called habituation.  Habituation is the repetition of similar activities in order to acquire a state (a virtue).  In doing the same activity all over again, one must be able to secure that what he is doing is the right thing to do in order to acquire the right attitude and the right virtue.  Like a craft, virtue is acquired by constantly perfecting the same activity that will yield the same particular virtue.  In doing a wheel, for example, a carpenter has to identify what stroke would yield a perfect round necessary to make a wheel.  Upon recognizing the best stroke, the carpenter has to perfect it in order to constantly produce wheels.  The art of a craft is imbibed through constant practice.  It may be written or maybe transferred through word of mouth, but it is only by doing it, and by doing it constantly and accurately that man will understand and will produce a craft.  It is doing again and again the right activity that will result to that same virtue.  In habituation, one must be fully aware that this particular activity results to this particular virtue and in the future, in order to acquire this virtue, this particular activity and not some other have to be performed.  Reason is also needed in habituation since it involves choosing between the right activity to do that will result to virtue and some other activities that will lead to other ends.  Proper understanding of the choices presupposes knowledge of them.

                        When doing an action, one is face with the question whether his action is voluntary or involuntary.  It will be voluntary when the agent has the full knowledge of the kind, the object, the intention, the consequence and other factors about his action.  Put simply, an action is voluntary when it originates internally.  An action becomes involuntary when it has an external origin rather than the agent doing the action.  Ignorance of particular also makes an action involuntary.  Ignorance of particulars is the ignorance of some aspects of an action and not all about it.  Total ignorance is not possible since it will result to unwillingness on the agent’s part.  It would be impossible for someone to do something without knowing it.  Action always proceeds from a knowledgeable agent although there are times that the agent is misguided, disoriented, confused and ignorant of some particulars.  But it cannot be that the agent knows nothing about his action for he would not engage in it or perform it.

                        We are responsible for our moral character.  The elements of luck in our moral development contribute a little but not so essential that it will affect the flourishing of our moral self.  It may have an impact but not so substantial that it will diminishes man’s responsibility for his actions.  Every action that proceeds from us has its origin from us.  Although it may be sometimes involuntary on our part and the consequences were not foreseen, the fact that it came from us, warrant responsibility from us. There are times when the consequences of our actions are not the intended ones.  In these moments we are still responsible for them since in the very outset, the action proceeds from us to the best of our knowledge.  Although unforeseen or unexpected, the consequences are already part of our action although not yet realized or made apparent to us.  Moral development is within our responsibility.  It is subject to our control, to our willingness and to our understanding.  We choose what we want to be.  We decide what virtues we will acquire.  We indulge in activities that we know will develop in us the virtues proper to us as individual.  If by luck we acquire the best virtues possible, or in contrast, it makes us worst, it does not discredit our capacity for reason, our right to be responsible, since in this case and in some others we always have a choice.   There are choices we properly understood and upon weighing them, we act accordingly.  We choose the best action that we can do given these choices.

I will conclude with the statement that man can be blamed or praised for his actions.  He may have involuntary actions sometimes but most of the time he is aware and knowledgeable and therefore accountable for his deeds.  Moral responsibility presupposes reason and man’s capacity for reason attests responsibility.